One laptop per child: Vision vs. reality by Kraemer, KL et al.
UC Irvine
UC Irvine Previously Published Works
Title
One laptop per child
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/172912cn
Journal
Communications of the ACM, 52(6)
ISSN
0001-0782
Authors
Kraemer, Kenneth L
Dedrick, Jason
Sharma, Prakul
Publication Date
2009-06-01
DOI
10.1145/1516046.1516063
License
CC BY 4.0
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
66    COmmuniCatiOns Of the aCm    |   jUNE 2009  |   vOl.  52  |   NO.  6
contributed articles
Although some developing coun-
tries are indeed deploying OLPC lap-
tops, others have cancelled planned 
deployments or are waiting on the 
results of pilot projects before decid-
ing whether to acquire them in num-
bers. Meanwhile, the OLPC organiza-
tion (www.olpc.com/) struggles with 
key staff defections, budget cuts, and 
ideological disillusionment, as it ap-
pears to some that the educational 
mission has given way to just getting 
laptops out the door. In addition, low-
cost commercial netbooks from Acer, 
Asus, Hewlett-Packard, and other PC 
vendors have been launched with great 
early success. 
So rather than distributing millions 
of laptops to poor children itself, OLPC 
has motivated the PC industry to devel-
op lower-cost, education-oriented PCs, 
providing developing countries with 
low-cost computing options directly in 
competition with OLPC’s own innova-
tion. In that sense, OLPC’s apparent 
failure may be a step toward broader 
success in providing a new tool for 
children in developing countries. How-
ever, it is also clear that the PC industry 
cannot profitably reach millions of the 
poorest children, so the OLPC objec-
tives might never be achieved through 
the commercial market alone. 
Here, we review and analyze the 
OLPC experience, focusing on the two 
most important issues: the successes 
and failures of OLPC in understand-
ing and adapting to the developing-
country environment and the unex-
pectedly aggressive reaction by the PC 
industry, including superpowers Intel 
and Microsoft, to defeat or co-opt the 
OLPC effort. 
OLPC created a novel technology, 
the XO laptop, developed with close at-
tention to the needs of students in poor 
rural areas. Yet it failed to anticipate 
the social and institutional problems 
that could arise in trying to diffuse that 
innovation in the developing-country 
context. In addition, OLPC has been 
stymied by underestimating the ag-
gressive reaction of the PC industry to 
the perceived threat of a $100 laptop 
at thE WorlD Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 
January 2005, Nicholas Negroponte unveiled the idea 
of One Laptop Per Child (OLPC), a $100 PC that would 
transform education for the world’s disadvantaged 
schoolchildren by giving them the means to teach 
themselves and each other. He estimated that up 
to 150 million of these laptops could be shipped 
annually by the end of 2007.4 With $20 million in 
startup investment, sponsorships and partnerships 
with major IT industry players, and interest from 
developing countries, the nonprofit OLPC project 
generated excitement among international leaders 
and the world media. Yet as of June 2009 only a few 
hundred thousand laptops have been distributed 
(they were first available in 2007), and OLPC has been 
forced to dramatically scale back its ambitions. 
DOi:10.1145/1516046.1516063
The vision is being overwhelmed by the reality 
of business, politics, logistics, and competing 
interests worldwide. 
By kenneth L. kRaemeR, JasOn DeDRiCk, anD PRakuL shaRma 
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being widely distributed in places the 
industry sees as emerging markets for 
its own products. 
The case of OLPC can be seen as a 
study in the general diffusion of in-
novation in developing countries. Our 
analysis draws on diffusion-of-innova-
tion theory, exemplified by Rogers,18 
and illustrates the difficulty in getting 
widespread adoption of even proven 
innovation due to misunderstanding 
the social and cultural environment 
in which the innovation is to be intro-
duced. We also bring to bear specific 
insights from the literature on adop-
tion of IT in developing countries,2,25 
using them to analyze the OLPC experi-
ence and draw implications for devel-
opers and policymakers. 
The original OLPC vision was to 
change education through the develop-
ment and distribution of low-cost lap-
tops embodying a new learning model 
to every child in the developing coun-
tries. Despite shifting over time, it can 
be characterized by the following text 
from the OLPC charter: “OLPC is not, 
at heart, a technology program, nor is 
the XO a product in any conventional 
sense of the word. OLPC is a nonprofit 
organization providing a means to 
an end—an end that sees children in 
even the most remote regions of the 
globe being given the opportunity to 
tap into their own potential, to be ex-
posed to a whole world of ideas, and 
to contribute to a more productive 
and saner world community” (www.
olpcnews.com/people/negroponte/
new_olpc_mission_statement.html). 
Conceived and led by Nicholas Ne-
groponte, a former director of MIT’s 
Media Lab, OLPC aimed to achieve its 
vision through extraordinary innova-
tion in hardware and software that 
fosters self-learning and fits with the 
often-harsh environment in develop-
ing countries. The hardware was to 
be a $100 laptop that would make af-
fordable the large-scale deployment of 
computer networks in their schools. 
The XO laptop developed by OLPC 
reflects hardware innovation in the 
power supply, display, networking, 
keyboard, and touchpad to provide a 
durable and interactive laptop (see the 
figure here). The shell of the machine is 
resistant to dirt and moisture, with all 
key parts designed to fit behind the dis-
play. It contains a pivoting, reversible, 
Worldwide distribution of XO laptops.
Country OLPC Web sitea
actual  
Deployments
Date of actual Deployment  
information/Detail
uruguay 202,000 150,000 november 2008b
Peru 145,000 40,000 100,000 in distributionc
mexico 50,000 50,000 starting to be shippedd
haiti 13,000 Dozens Pilot began in summer 2008e
afghanistan 11,000 450 expected to rise to 2010f
mongolia 10,100 3,000 g1g1 laptops beneficiaryg
rwanda 16,000 10,000 arrived, not deployed;  
infrastructure issuesh
nepal 6,000 6,000 Delivered april 2007i
ethiopia 5,000 5,000 three schoolsj
Paraguay 4,000 150 4,000 planned next quarterk
cambodia 3,200 1,040 January 29, 2009l
guatemala 3,000 — Planned before  
third quarter 2009m
colombia 2,600 1,580 January 25, 2009n;  
agreement to buy 65,000 xoso
brazil 2,600 630 february 6, 2009p
india 505 31 January 20, 2009q
a oLPc numbers include “xo’s delivered, shipped, or ordered” but do not  
distinguish between these categories; wiki.laptop.org/go/Deployments 
b tabare, V. uruguay: When education meets technology. Miami Herald (nov. 22, 2008), a21. 
c Peru on the up and up, lessons to be learned. Business News Americas (Dec. 18, 2008). 
d www.bnamericas.com/story.xsql?id_sector=1&id_noticia=431002&tx_idioma=i&source= 
e www.olpceu.org/content/xo_stories/haiti/haiti.html 
f www.olpcnews.com/countries/afghanistan/olpc_afghanistan_first_school_day.html 
g www.olpceu.org/content/xo_stories/mongolia/mongolia.html 
h www.olpceu.org/content/xo_stories/rwanda/rwanda.html 
i www.olpceu.org/content/xo_stories/nepal/nepal.html 
j http://www.olpceu.org/content/xo_stories/ethiopia/ethiopia.html 
k bucaramanga computers, oLPc, gemalto. Business News Americas (feb. 9, 2009). 
l wiki.laptop.org/go/oLPc_cambodia 
m wiki.laptop.org/go/oLPc_guatemala 
n wiki.laptop.org/go/oLPc_colombia 
o Pilar saenz, oLPc Volunteer in colombia (email) 
p download.laptop.org/content/conf/20080520-country-wkshp/Presentations/oLPc%20country%20 
meeting%20-%20Day%204%20-%20may%2023rd,%202008/brazil%20-%20Jose%20aquino%20
-%20govt%20of%20brazil.ppt#266,8,slide 8 
q www.olpceu.org/content/xo_stories/india/india.html 
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dual-mode (monochrome for outside, 
color for indoors) display, movable rub-
ber WiFi antennas with wireless mesh 
networking, and a sealed rubber-mem-
brane keyboard that can be customized 
for different languages. For low power 
consumption and ruggedness, the XO 
design intentionally omits all motor-
driven moving parts. It was developed 
jointly by the MIT Media Lab, OLPC, 
and Quanta, a Taiwan-based original 
design manufacturer, and is manufac-
tured by Quanta in Songjiang, China. 
The software for the XO consists of 
a pared-down version of the Fedora Li-
nux operating system and specially de-
signed graphical user interface called 
Sugar. It was developed by the project to 
explore naturalistic concepts related to 
learning, openness, and collaboration.a 
Pilot implementation 
High-level officials, including even 
prime ministers and education minis-
ters, in some developing countries are 
enthusiastic about OLPC, committed 
to purchases and/or trial-distribution 
projects. OLPC pilots in a half-dozen 
countries report positive changes (such 
as increased enrollment in schools, 
decreased absenteeism, increased 
discipline, and more participation in 
classrooms), but it is not clear if these 
changes are directly related to OLPC, 
as many evaluations are neither inde-
pendent nor systematic. Independent 
evaluations in Ethiopia and Uruguay 
cite a positive effect on the availability 
of learning material via the laptop but 
also problems with buggy input devic-
es, connectivity, software functionality, 
and teacher training.8,12,13 
As of June 2009 the largest ongoing 
pilot project is in Peru, which planned 
to distribute 140,000 XOs in 2008, even 
into rural areas high in the Andes where 
electricity is often limited and Internet 
connections are not available. There is 
enthusiasm among students and teach-
a Chief among them are collaboration and ex-
pression (such as Web browsing, email, on-
line chat, word processing, drawing, music 
sequencing, and programming); groups and 
neighborhoods to signify other users in physi-
cal and logical proximity; a view-source-code 
key to encourage users to tinker with the code; 
replacing files and folders with “journals” that 
store activities performed by users; and tag-
ging, clipping, sharing, and searching as sys-
temwide features.22
ers in the villages and support from the 
national education ministry and re-
gional governors who have requested 
500,000 more laptops.9 However, re-
ports from the classroom suggest that 
teacher training is limited, and willing-
ness to adopt a new approach to teach-
ing is questionable. Children are excit-
ed but somewhat confused about the 
use of the machines, and educational 
software is lacking or difficult to use. 
Also, if a machine fails, it is up to the 
family to replace it or the child must do 
without.20 
targeted Cost 
Despite its considerable innovation, or 
perhaps because of it, the OLPC proj-
ect has been unable to achieve its $100 
targeted cost. The current cost of each 
unit is listed on the OLPC Website as 
$199 (www.laptop.org/en/participate/
ways-to-give.shtml). However, this does 
not include upfront deployment costs, 
which are said to add an additional 
5%–10% to the cost of each machine 
(wiki.laptop.org/go/Larger_OLPC), 
and subsequent IT-management costs. 
Nor does it include the cost of teacher 
training, additional software, and on-
going maintenance and support. OLPC 
initially required governments to pur-
chase a million units, then reduced 
the number to 250,000 in April 2007. 
Such large purchases are difficult to 
justify for governments in developing 
countries, and the requirement was ul-
timately eliminated. 
Some countries eventually lost inter-
est due to the higher costs of the XO. 
For example, Nigeria failed to honor a 
pledge by its former president to pur-
chase a million units, partly because 
they no longer cost $100 apiece.21 
Meanwhile, other countries, including 
Libya, have opted for the Intel Class-
mate, which is priced at approximately 
$250 for the PC alone. Officials in Libya, 
which had planned to buy up to 1.2 mil-
lion XO laptops, became concerned that 
the machines lacked Windows, and that 
service, teacher training, and future up-
grades would not be provided directly 
by OLPC. Subsidies from Intel, includ-
ing donated laptops and teacher train-
ing, also helped persuade the Libyan 
government to choose the Classmate.21
Production, sales, Distribution 
OLPC originally estimated that it would 
expecting a laptop 
to cause such 
revolutionary 
change showed  
a degree of  
naiveté, even for  
an organization  
with the best 
intentions and 
smartest people. 
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ship 100–150 million XO laptops by the 
end of 2007, but the program has clear-
ly fallen far short. Under more mod-
est goals, production was supposed to 
reach five million laptops by the end 
of 2008. By contrast, industry analysts 
report that Quanta’s manufacturing ef-
fort began only in December 2007 and 
reached a total of 370,500 units by third 
quarter 2008.16 
Early commitments for a million 
XOs each from Brazil, Libya, and Nige-
ria evaporated, but relatively large pur-
chases were made by Uruguay (200,000), 
Peru (145,000), and Mexico (50,000). 
In November 2007, OLPC launched a 
philanthropy program called Give One 
Get One (G1G1, www.olpcnews.com/
countries/usa/olpc_xo_laptop_sale.
html) where people in the U.S. could 
buy two machines for $399, with one 
being sent to a child in a developing 
country. The first program was success-
ful, with about 167,000 units sold, but 
a second G1G1 program in November 
2008 resulted in only 12,500 units sold. 
Lagging production and sales mean 
that distribution has also lagged. The 
table here lists distribution as reported 
by OLPC, but many units have yet to be 
deployed to their intended recipients. 
What has the project accomplished? 
Why is it so short of its original goals? 
To answer, we look in more detail at 
where OLPC succeeded and failed in 
understanding the developing-country 
environment and how it was being con-
fronted by the PC industry. 
analysis 
OLPC dedicated a great deal of effort to 
designing a laptop that would function 
well in a developing-country environ-
ment. OLPC’s technologist culture en-
couraged innovation, showing a good 
understanding of what was needed in 
developing countries. For example, the 
XO is sealed to keep out dirt, has a dis-
play that can be read in bright sunlight, 
runs on low power, and is rugged. 
At the same time, the decision to 
use the Linux/Sugar operating system 
and interface was driven by a combina-
tion of pragmatic considerations and 
open source ideology. From a pragmat-
ic point of view, Linux doesn’t require 
the computing power of Windows and 
has a price tag (zero) compatible with 
the goal of minimizing cost. 
Diffusion of IT innovation does not 
depend only on the nature of the in-
novation itself. Often, more important 
is the social and cultural environment 
in which it will operate.3,26 Informa-
tion technologies are not standalone 
innovations but system innovations, 
the value of which depends largely on 
an ecosystem that includes hardware, 
applications, peripherals, network 
infrastructure, and services (such as 
installation, training, repair, and tech-
nical support). Deployment involves 
training teachers, creating software 
and digital content, delivering main-
tenance and support, and sustaining a 
long-term commitment. Such capabili-
ties are in short supply in developing 
countries,7,26 and OLPC simply never 
had the resources to provide them. 
The OLPC plan was to rely on gov-
ernments to buy its machines, provide 
distribution and support, train teach-
ers to use and maintain them, and even 
sponsor development of local-language 
software. OLPC established its own dis-
tribution network or worked with local 
voluntary organizations in some coun-
tries to help with implementation. For 
global distribution, OLPC reached (in 
2007) a comprehensive agreement 
with cellphone distributor Brightstar 
of Miami, FL, to help manage the com-
plexities of entering diverse markets.23 
However, none of these institutions 
had the ability to scale up to deploy-
ment of millions of machines. This 
situation is common in developing 
countries where endemic problems 
of infrastructure, financial resources, 
technical skills, and waning political 
support “hinder both the completion 
of IS innovation initiatives and the re-
alization of their expected benefits.”b 
IT innovation is also part of socially 
embedded systems, the use of which 
cannot be isolated from the social and 
cultural environment or from local 
norms of practice.1,25 In some cases, 
teachers and the educational estab-
lishment have resisted innovation that 
b Negroponte seems to question whether teach-
ers are needed at all. Speaking about provid-
ing the rural poor a solid educational basis for 
development at the 2007 Digital, Life, Design 
conference in Munich, Germany, Negroponte 
said: “It’s not about training teachers. It’s not 
about building schools. With all due respect 
[to Hewlett-Packard’s e-inclusion efforts], it’s 
not about curriculum or content. It’s about le-
veraging the children themselves.”24
PC makers across 
the board are still 
seeking a formula 
for well-designed, 
low-cost computing 
devices, along with 
a complementary 
delivery value  
chain, market 
strategy, and 
business model.  
XO features.
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requires a significant change in peda-
gogy and that might reduce teacher 
status.b Even when the laptops are ad-
opted, they are not always used as en-
visioned by OLPC or by education min-
isters. One Peruvian teacher said, “The 
ministry would want us to use the lap-
top every day for long periods of time. 
But we have decided to set rules in our 
school and, really, the laptop, it’s only 
a tool for us.”10 
Such resistance is no surprise to 
students of innovation diffusion or of 
IT for development. Rogers18 pointed 
to examples where innovation dif-
fusion failed due to cultural norms 
and the effects of such innovation on 
existing institutional arrangements. 
Avgerou2 noted that attitudes toward 
hierarchy are particularly problematic 
in developing countries. An example 
illustrating both themes is that the Pe-
ruvian experiment was initiated with-
out being explained to the national 
teachers’ union.10 OLPC has strong 
support from the Peruvian Education 
Ministry, but ultimately teachers must 
actually use the machines in the class-
room, and they are likely to see the 
union as an ally while possibly mis-
trusting the ministry. 
The fact that OLPC was much stron-
ger in developing innovative technol-
ogy than in understanding how to 
diffuse it may reflect the engineering 
orientation of the organization and its 
lack of understanding of the needs or 
interests of the nontechnical people 
who will ultimately buy and use the in-
novation. This is illustrated by David 
Cavallo, OLPC’s chief education archi-
tect, saying, “We’re hoping that these 
countries won’t just make up ground 
but will jump into a new educational 
environment.”9 Expecting a laptop 
to cause such revolutionary change 
showed a degree of naiveté, even for an 
organization with the best intentions 
and smartest people. 
Competitive Response 
from the PC industry 
The OLPC project was a potential threat 
to the PC industry in emerging markets. 
OLPC’s use of an AMD microprocessor 
and Linux operating system was a po-
tential threat to the dominant position 
and historically high profit margins 
of Intel and Microsoft. Its targeting 
of a new market (developing-country 
is marketing it aggressively against the 
XO worldwide. It secured deals to sell 
hundreds of thousands of Classmates 
in Libya, Nigeria, and Pakistan, some 
of the very countries OLPC was count-
ing on. Intel launched a series of pilot 
projects in these countries, saying it 
will also test the Classmate in at least 
22 others while donating thousands of 
machines.21 Intel briefly joined OLPC 
in July 2007 but got into a nondispar-
agement dispute with Negroponte and 
dropped out only seven months later.14 
In 2007, Microsoft offered to make 
available Windows, a student version 
of Microsoft Office, and educational 
programs to developing countries for 
$3 per copy when used on computers 
in schools. OLPC then decided to allow 
Windows on the XO, a choice driven by 
demands from some governments for 
Windows-based PCs. Even in countries 
with very low levels of PC penetration, 
officials who make purchasing deci-
sions may favor a technology standard 
(the Wintel design) they are familiar 
with or believe children must learn on 
systems they will encounter later in the 
work force. 
The OLPC project also stimulated 
innovation in low-cost, low-power PCs. 
Seeing OLPC’s success in developing 
a sub-$200 notebook, Asustek intro-
duced the EeePC notebook in 2007 for 
the educational and consumer mar-
kets in both developed and developing 
countries, selling more than 300,000 
schools) that existing PC makers were 
not serving raised the prospect that 
OLPC might gain a foothold in emerg-
ing markets more generally. Moreover, 
the XO’s ultra-low price raised the like-
lihood of a new price point for note-
books, potentially forcing PC makers 
to cannibalize existing low-end prod-
ucts in order to compete (and is what 
ultimately happened). 
Branded PC makers have always 
faced competition from cheap local 
brands and clone makers in develop-
ing countries, but OLPC threatened 
to grab a share of education budgets 
worldwide that PC makers hoped to 
tap for themselves. Negroponte’s high-
profile announcement of the project 
and the publicity he garnered quickly 
caught the industry’s attention. 
Leading companies first responded 
by disparaging the XO as a useless toy. 
Intel’s Craig Barrett called it “a gadget,” 
saying people want the full functional-
ity of a PC.17 Bill Gates said “...geez, get 
a decent computer where you can actu-
ally read the text and you’re not sitting 
there cranking the thing while you’re 
trying to type.”11 Before long, however, 
the industry began to respond with ac-
tion, not just words. 
In 2006, Intel introduced a small 
laptop—the Classmate—for devel-
oping countries that today sells for 
$230–$300. Intel has since licensed the 
Classmate reference design to PC mak-
ers to manufacture and distribute and 
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units in four months. It was soon 
joined by major PC makers, including 
Acer, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, and many 
smaller ones in creating a new category 
of PC known today as netbooks. 
While the XO was specifically de-
signed for the poor, rural education 
market in developing countries, net-
book vendors target urban consumer 
and education markets in developed, 
as well as emerging, markets. In 2008, 
the netbook market exploded, with 
sales of 10 million units worldwide 
mostly running Intel’s low-cost Atom 
processor and Windows; sales are ex-
pected to double in 2009.16 
The OLPC has been credited with 
spurring the netbook market, but the 
competition it spurred is now OLPC’s 
own biggest challenge. Developing 
countries today have a wide choice of 
vendors offering inexpensive netbooks, 
and, though not designed like the XO 
for the rigors of poor rural villages, they 
are competitive in large, easier-to-serve 
urban populations. OLPC responded 
by announcing in January 2009 that 
its second-generation laptop design 
would be licensed freely to PC makers 
to manufacture and distribute, hoping 
to use the resources of these firms to 
get millions of laptops into the hands 
of poor children in developing coun-
tries. Negroponte hopes to have a pro-
totype in 18 months (from January), 
selling them for perhaps $75 each.5 
Lessons 
The OLPC experience offers lessons for 
innovators and others aiming to intro-
duce and deploy IT innovation to benefit 
the poor, as well as for the governments 
of developing countries. For innovators, 
we thus draw three general lessons: 
Diffusing a new innovation requires 
understanding the local environment. 
OLPC recognized correctly that lap-
tops could reach the poorest children 
only if they were subsidized by govern-
ment or other funding sources. This 
is similar to rural electrification and 
telephone service, which usually can-
not be provided economically and end 
up subsidized by government or by 
charges to urban customers who can 
be served profitably. However, innova-
tors should understand that govern-
ments are not monolithic entities, nor 
are they the same from one country to 
the next. In some cases, funding can 
be allocated by an education ministry, 
in others it must be approved by the 
legislature, and in others provincial or 
local governments have jurisdiction. 
Commitments from high-level officials 
or political leaders are as binding as a 
politician’s campaign promises.26 Fly-
ing into a country and winning initial 
support is only a first step and must be 
followed by a sustained effort by people 
with a deep understanding of the local 
environment to ensure commitment 
leads to money and action. 
Likewise, social, economic, and 
cultural environments vary greatly 
across and even within countries, and 
deploying new technologies requires 
understanding these environments. 
Innovators must consider the need for 
expertise in sociology, anthropology, 
public policy, and economics, as well 
as for engineers, and establish coher-
ent criteria for selecting countries to 
target based on social, economic, and 
political characteristics. Success in a 
few developing countries is critical to 
broad diffusion, as potential adopters 
look to their peers for evidence of the 
value of the innovation.18 
Innovative technology can be disrup-
tive and trigger a backlash from incum-
bents. Some innovations pose a threat 
to industry incumbents, who may seek 
to undermine the innovator’s efforts. 
The more visible the threat, the stron-
ger the reaction is likely to be. This il-
lustrates a dilemma for developers. A 
program less ambitious and less pub-
licized than OLPC might not attract 
the attention of industry incumbents 
but also might not attract the partners, 
investors, and other sponsors needed 
to develop and deploy the innovation. 
As multinational companies direct 
more attention to emerging markets 
and so-called “bottom of the pyramid” 
consumers, there is more likelihood 
of competition but also more opportu-
nity for cooperation as well. PC makers 
across the board are still seeking a for-
mula for well-designed, low-cost com-
puting devices, along with a comple-
mentary delivery value chain, market 
strategy, and business model. 
Innovative information technologies 
do not stand alone. A technology like 
the XO is a system-level innovation that 
requires complementary assets to be 
valuable. While OLPC was able to deliv-
er high-level design and hand off devel-
opment and manufacturing to Quanta, 
it had no one to handle marketing, 
deployment, and support.15 Unlike the 
commercial PC companies, it was not 
part of any established business ecol-
ogy and lacked resources to establish 
its own ecology. 
For developing countries, interna-
tional agencies, and philanthropists, 
there are other kinds of lessons: 
the 2010 version of the One Laptop per Child, the XO-2, will have a foldable e-book form  
and reduce power consumption to one watt.
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Understand the true costs and risks, 
as well as benefits, of innovation. IT in-
novation like the XO may offer great 
benefits but also involves costs and 
risks. The purchase of a laptop is mere-
ly the start of a stream of ongoing costs. 
The total cost of ownership for a laptop 
program could include infrastructure 
investment, training, tech support, 
hardware maintenance, software li-
censes and upgrades, and replacement 
expenditures. Cost can also include 
the opportunity cost or the foregone 
investment in teachers, facilities, or 
other educational materials7 cited by 
India’s education ministry as its main 
reason for not joining OLPC.6 
There is also a risk that the expected 
benefits might not be realized. Prob-
lems in implementation could limit ac-
tual use, and the need for ongoing fund-
ing means that the innovation might 
not be sustainable beyond some initial 
period.2, 13 Another risk is investing in a 
technology platform that might not be 
supported in the future; for instance, 
investment in software, content, and 
training for the XO platform could be 
wasted if OLPC would disappear. 
Policymakers are able to reduce the 
risk if they make major acquisition de-
cisions only after careful evaluation of 
pilot projects that enable learning first-
hand how the technology fits with their 
educational goals and environment. 
Learning from other countries’ expe-
rience can be valuable even when the 
context is different; Al-Gahtani1 says 
that successful pilot projects by peers 
in other developing countries help re-
duce the perceived risk of adoption. 
Adopting organizations need to de-
velop internal capabilities and set priori-
ties. Although governments might re-
ceive outside assistance for trials, they 
must be able to sustain the innovation 
in the development of digital educa-
tional content, training of teachers to 
integrate ICT-based educational mate-
rials in the teaching-learning process, 
and design and installation of sup-
porting IT and power infrastructure. 
For example, one independent evalua-
tion concluded: “While the Uruguayan 
government is making a great effort in 
providing funding for the hardware, 
there is no funding for designing and 
developing software and content for 
use with the laptops or for conduct-
ing a thorough evaluation of the edu-
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cational and societal outcomes of the 
project.”13 Other evaluations argue that 
the countrywide deployments envis-
aged by OLPC are simply beyond the 
resources of any developing country, 
saying that governments must set pri-
orities regarding goals and the regions, 
sectors, and schools to be served.8, 12 
Conclusion 
The potential significance of the XO, 
as well as of other IT innovations, in 
developing countries calls for system-
atic, independent evaluation—a true 
“grand challenge” for the computing 
and social science communities. Re-
searchers can provide value by con-
ducting well-designed studies of the 
diffusion and results of such innova-
tion. The knowledge created promises 
to prevent wasting a great deal of mon-
ey and effort and lead to quicker diffu-
sion and better use of innovations that 
prove beneficial. While OLPC has so far 
fallen short of its goals, there is much 
yet to be learned by studying this case 
of IT innovation.  
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